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Abstract 
This study examines how internal governance structures in corporate organisations function in ensuring good 
corporate governance. It contributes to the extant art of knowledge by shedding light on how ownership and board 
control structures in corporate organisations operate to achieving good corporate governance in developing 
countries. Using interviews, observations and archival records, catholic and significant data is collected from four 
large quoted corporate organisations on the Ghana Stock Exchange for the analysis of the study. By linking the 
data to the theoretical propositions, the study reveals that these four corporate organisations are characterised by 
the presence of large shareholders and as a result, they tend to wield extensive control over the activities of the 
companies through their involvement in the decision-making processes. This sort of involvement by large 
shareholders in the decision-making processes of the companies is as a result of the incessant flow of information 
from the companies’ management to them. However, whilst the presence of large shareholders has the tendency 
to solving the principal-agent problem, it poses challenges in regards to minority shareholders’ interests in these 
corporate organisations. Small equity holders of the companies only rely on the minimum statutory disclosures in 
the annual reports of the companies and are always relegated to the background in times of information sharing. 
The study also highlights that boards of directors tend to exercise control over corporate organisations when 
majority shareholders stop interfering in their dealings. This implies that when major shareholders fully partake in 
corporate decision-making processes of companies, boards of directors seem to be sheer advisory bodies to 
management.  
Keywords: Ownership control, Board control, Board of directors, Ownership structure, Corporate Governance, 
Ghana.  
 
1. Introduction     
Corporate governance has recently become a well-deliberated and disputatious subject matter in press (Larcker 
& Tayan, 2011) and management sciences. Accounting manipulations, unwarranted compensation packages, 
insider trading and other identified corporate let-downs that are generally considered as consequences of 
managerial wrongdoings in corporate organisations are virtually reported every day by the media. These 
managerial wrongdoings have largely occurred in developed economies-such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Japan and other Continental European countries-and for that matter it is incumbent on developing and 
transition economies to strive to ensure good corporate governance practices in their countries to obviate falling 
perniciously into such managerial catastrophe. In so doing, studies in regards to corporate governance practices 
in these economies are considered necessary and highly desirable in the sense that they can contribute 
immensely to the socio-economic development of these countries (McGee, 2009).             
 
Studies on corporate governance in developing and transition economies form a minute proportion of studies in 
the management sciences across the length and breadth of the globe. But it is worth considering that corporate 
governance in recent times is gaining grounds in developing and transition economies. Boards of directors, 
shareholders, managers of corporate organisations, governments and other stakeholders in these economies have 
begun realizing the germaneness of having effective corporate governance system (McGee, 2009). Recent 
studies that have concentrated on developing and transition economies include researches of Shukeri, Shin and 
Shaari (2012), Ghabayen (2012), Amaral-Baptista, Klotzle and Campelo de Melo (2011), and Babatunde and 
Olaniran (2009). However, these studies have largely concentrated on developing and transition economies in 
Southern America and Asia, with insignificant amount focusing on African economies. For instance, Shukeri et 
al. (2012) study was conducted on 300 publicly-traded corporate organisations in Malaysia. Ghabayen (2012) 
study also concentrated on 102 firms in corporate organisations in Saudi Arabia. Amaral-Baptista et al. (2011) 
work focused on 121 publicly-quoted firms on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), Brazil. With this 
concentration of  substantial amount of studies on corporate governance in these continents and how good 
corporate governance practices can help increase stock price and make it quite easier for corporate entities in 
Africa to secure low-cost capital,  there is indisputable rationalisation for carrying out corporate governance 
works in an African context.      
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Possessing the characteristics of other developing and transition economies, studies on corporate governance 
practice in Ghana are scanty, and aspects pertaining to how internal governance mechanisms in corporate 
organisations work have not, to the best of our knowledge, been appropriately dealt with. It is against this 
backdrop that this paper aims at filling this research lacuna by examining how shareholder and board control 
systems within corporate organisations function to ensuring effective corporate governance. The paper’s research 
questions are twofold: 1) how does shareholder control lead to effective corporate governance; and 2) how does 
board control system within a corporate organisation lead to effective corporate governance.   
 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 addresses the paper’s literature review and 
propositions. The study’s methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 highlights the findings of the cases. 
Finally, section 5 concludes the study.  
 
2. Literature review and propositions 
2.1 Ownership structure and shareholder control  
Bebchuk (1999) contends that corporate systems that are characterised or not characterised by a controlling 
shareholder are distinctively critical in some ways. In corporate entities where ownership is fragmented, 
shareholder control leads to a struggle for superiority or victory between rivals in that a rival can seek to usurp 
control forcefully from the incumbent contrary to its (incumbent) will. Contrariwise, in corporations where 
ownership is concentrated, control is not contestable but instead it is ‘fixed’ in the sense that it is confined and 
cannot be obtained contrary to the will of the incumbent but through only negotiation with the incumbent 
(Bebchuck, 1999). There are arguments that the presence of controlling shareholders will permit minority 
shareholders to play a lesser role on how the corporate organisation is governed (Okpara, 2010). For instance, if 
a person holds 10 percent of the total stocks of a corporate organisation and the remainders are highly dispersed, 
it is pretty probable that he/she could exercise a certain level of influence in the corporate organisation. 
However, if the remaining equity holders of the corporate organisation include two block holders of 40 per cent 
each, then with their collusion, the 10 percent he/she holds would not possibly give him/her the kind of influence 
he/she desires. It is also expected that small shareholders’ interests will be violated because of their role in the 
company. Berglof and Claessens (2004) in their study on corporate governance in developing economies found 
that large equity holders, with their control rights, are inclined to abuse minority equity holders in that there is a 
presence of weak legal protection to safeguard the interests of minority equity holders. However, with the role of 
large shareholders in controlling corporate organisations, all shareholders irrespective of their holdings, benefit. 
This is because shareholder control over the corporation’s management induces corporate managers to gear 
corporate decision-making processes towards shareholder wealth maximisation. Although the presence of large 
shareholders in corporate organisations exposes minority shareholders to some disadvantages as mentioned 
above, minority shareholders also reap some advantages when corporate decision-making processes are geared 
towards shareholder value maximisation. Carlsson (2003) argues that when large chunks of stocks fall in the 
hands of a single individual or a small group of equity holders, there is an incentive on the part of these equity 
holders to monitor and control management painstakingly and enhance corporate efficiency. If the ownership 
structure at the initial stages is widely fragmented, the rise of a large equity holder will perhaps overcome the 
free-rider problem in monitoring and controlling management, and the rights of the largest equity holder can 
minimise its urge for expropriation and maximise incentives to pay out corporate dividends (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Okpara (2010) also posits that equity holders who hold large number of stocks thus limit agency problem 
by having a sufficient number of stake to take a more active and effective interest in the corporate body. The 
implication is that these large equity holders have sufficient influence and ownership in dealing with their 
monitoring and controlling activities in corporate organisations that will eventually serve shareholder interest. 
Therefore, we propose that: 
Proposition 1: Shareholders with large shareholdings exert shareholder control in a corporate body.    
 
2.2 Board of directors and board Control 
Bebchuk (1999) suggest that it is time that academics and business practitioners breathe life into the notion of 
the equity holder-controlled public corporate entities. But in a sharp contrast, Stout (2007) argues that since 
board control has both costs and benefits, the astuteness of Bebchuk’s proposal to make it easy for equity holders 
to oust board of directors must be evidence-based.  The author continues that empirical evidence strongly 
supports the claim that equity holders themselves usually prefer corporate entities with a very pungent and robust 
board control. And if that is the case, why then do observers still believe that there should be shareholder control 
at the expense of board control?  
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Stout (2007) argues that the expressive appeal of equity holder control can be traced to three main sources: a 
common but deceptive metaphor that considers equity holders as the owners of corporate entities; the 
opportunistic calls of activist equity holders in quest of leverage over board of directors for selfish gains; and a 
strong but a slur sense that something ought to be done in the wake of current corporate scandals. There are a lot 
of reasons why equity holders in public firms do have little to control boards and for that matter, corporations.  
Firstly, the activities of board of directors benefit equity holders by carrying out a significant economic function. 
Perhaps, the most palpable is the promotion of a more efficient and well-informed business decision making. 
The reason is that it is difficult and more cumbersome to bring together thousands of dispersed equity holders to 
put forth their views on how to run the corporate entity. Also, given the illogical apathy most equity holders 
bring to the forth, should we anticipate that equity holder control will probably produce first-class outcomes? 
Corollary to this, most experts agree that board control offers significant advantages with regards to efficient and 
well-informed decision making in a firm.  
 
Furthermore, the power of boards without a doubt serves equity holder interests by safeguarding them (equity 
holders) from each other. Stout (2007) contends that the risk that equity holders with large stocks might attempt 
to manipulate corporate decisions in a selfish way that harms other equity holders is rampant in closely held 
corporate entities. Harris and Raviv (2007) in examining equity holder control found out that some equity 
holders have different agendas other than value maximisation. More often than not, it has been claimed that large 
equity holders sometimes want to use corporate resources to promote a social or political agenda at the expense 
of value maximisation.   
 
Therefore, equity holders can be exploited not only by corporate managers and board of directors, but also their 
fellow equity holders. Stout (2007) argues that equity holders face the risk of being exploited because stock is, 
counter-intuitively, and illiquid venture. If shareholders control corporate entities, at a lesser extent, some may 
try to use their influence in an opportunistic manner at the expense of other stakeholders. This is as a result of the 
capabilities on the part of equity holders to threaten other stakeholders’ interests of the company. For instance, 
equity holders can raise earnings by demanding that, long-term employees should allow their health benefits to 
be reduced or risk being fired, or by requiring customers to buy additional software to make sure that they get 
continued customer assistance.  
 
The discussion so far has pointed to the assertion that shareholders should not be the controlling force in a 
corporate entity and that it is incumbent on the board to ensure that it (board) exercises the full control function 
as proposed by Stout (2007). But one should bear in mind that not all boards are capable of ensuring effective 
and efficient board control to the benefit of its shareholders and other stakeholders. Castellini and Agyemang 
(2012) suggest four major ideas that would assist boards to effectively and efficiently exercise their control 
function: instituting audit committee (with well-qualified independent Non-Executive Directors), the 
establishment of remuneration committee (with well-qualified independent Non-Executive Directors), the non-
duality structure, and effective and efficient board meetings.  
 
Recent corporate scandals and frauds have necessitated the establishment of board audit committees in corporate 
organisations to help boards in accomplishing their fiduciary duties. With audit committees, boards of corporate 
organisations would be able to appraise the satisfactoriness of the resources for both internal and external audit 
functions and insure that their work strategies offer a satisfactory exposure of possible risk areas (Arguden, 
2009). The membership of the audit committee must consist of individuals who have both the alacrity and 
capability to savvy complex concepts in accounting and auditing. Apart from such characteristics, board audit 
committee member-composition has become important issue in corporate governance debate. There is an 
argument that the inclusion of insiders on board audit committees does help audit committees in regards to their 
functionality. 
 
Conger (2009) argues that the inclusion of insiders on audit committees offer an in-depth perspective on the 
corporate organisation. He further argues that insiders also offer a better source of information about corporate 
organisations, their operations as well as the environments in which they operate. Contrary to this argument, in 
their work on shareholder and board control systems, Agyemang and Castellini (2013) argue that the 
involvement of insiders on the audit committee would swing the balance of power between the board and 
management in support of the latter, resulting in management control over the activities of the board audit 
committee and degrading the aptitude of the audit committee to effectively and efficiently perform its functions. 
This implies that the membership composition of audit committees must only be made up of Non-executive 
directors who are independent of management. It is therefore expected that, instituting board audit committee 
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with well qualified independent non-executive directors as its members would ensure board effectiveness and 
consequently result in board control. We therefore, propose that: 
Proposition 2a. Instituting an audit committee with well-qualified independent Non-Executive Directors, leads to 
an extensive board control in a corporate entity 
 
The board remuneration committee is argued to be one of the cornerstone committees of the board. This 
committee is required to examine the overall remuneration structure of the corporate organisation to establish 
suitable incentive packages for corporate managers and employees alike. Many codes and principles of corporate 
governance around the globe suggest that there should be board remuneration committees in corporate 
organisations to insure that independent CEO evaluation and remuneration take place (OECD, 1999; 2004; 
CACG, 1999; Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana’s guidelines, 2010). Nevertheless, like the audit 
committee, the membership composition of this committee has also received attention in the current corporate 
governance debate. In Ghana, the 2010 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Guidelines of Corporate 
Governance suggests that the remuneration committee should entirely consist of independent non-executive 
directors. The rationale behind this recommendation is that if executive directors become members of the 
committee, they may be biased towards the CEO, resulting in incentive packages that would one-sidedly enrich 
management to the detriment of equity holders (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013).  Therefore, it is expected that, 
establishing a board remuneration committee with well-informed independent non-executive directors as its 
members would insure board effectiveness, which will finally lead to board control. We thus propose that:    
Proposition 2b. Establishing a remuneration committee with well-qualified independent Non-Executive 
Directors, leads to an Extensive board control in a company.   
 
The idea of a dual leadership structure was among the initial applications of the principal-agent theory. The 
emergence of leadership structure on boards has influenced how well boards are able to demonstrate their 
monitoring, sleuthing and controlling functions over corporate managers and corporate organisations (Lorsch, 
2009). There is an argument that the non-duality structure produces a new stratum of agency cost and raises 
information transfer cost from the CEO to the Chairperson (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1994). As long as the CEO 
controls the quality, quantity and timing of available information to directors, it is quite difficult for directors to 
be sure of getting what they really need for true independent supervision. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996), and 
Daily and Dalton (1997) argue that there is no dissimilarities in the financial performance between corporations 
with and without combined positions, describing them as either ‘fussing about’ or ‘much ado about nothing’. 
Dalton and Dalton (2009) contend that the separation of these two roles does not necessarily indicate 
independence of the leadership structure. Their argument stems from the assertion that in most cases the person 
who is the ‘separate’ board chairperson is the former CEO of the firm. In some cases too this separate board 
chairperson is either the founder of the firm or former CEO of acquired or merged companies. The authors 
further argue that a single voice directing the company at the board level is the most efficient and effective form 
of leadership. In this situation, “there will be no parties and constituencies-internal and external- who will 
question who is in charge and who is accountable” (p. 83). The fundamental idea is that any subordinate or 
minor must be supervised by a single and clear-cut authority. For instance Mathew 6:24 state “no one can be a 
subordinate to two masters…..” (Good News Bible, 2007).  
 
However, there are also arguments that the principal-agent problem is intensified when an individual performs 
these two roles-CEO and board chairperson roles. The 2010 SEC Guidelines of Corporate Governance of Ghana 
and other corporate governance observers (Jensen, 1993; Millstein & McAvoy, 2003; Pease & McMillan, 1993; 
Castellini & Agyemang, 2012; Agyemang & Castellini, 2013) have argued that the roles of the chief executive 
officer and board chairperson - the two most important roles in corporate organisations-should be performed by 
different persons. The chairperson of a corporate organisation cannot serve as the chief executive officer since 
the CEO is the leader of the company’s management and the chairperson is the principal overseer of the board, 
which includes the chief executive officer. Iskander and Chamlou (2000) argue that the combination of the two 
roles will definitely lead to moral hazard. Also, if the chairperson is the chief executive officer, there can be the 
presence of real conflict “when the tie-breaking vote is cast” (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000, p.103). In Ghana, the 
2010 SEC Guidelines of Corporate Governance considers the non-duality structure as a conduit of enhancing 
board effectiveness in regards to board control, which eventually leads to good corporate governance. It is 
expected that the non-duality structure leads to board effectiveness in Ghana. Therefore, we propose that:  
Proposition 2c. The non-duality structure leads to board control in a company. 
 
Board meetings vary across corporate organisations. The number of board meetings in corporate organisations 
becomes higher in times of crises than in normal settings. Huse (2007) contends that the time-span of board 
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meetings is considered as one of the principal constraints of board effectiveness. He argues further that longer 
meetings may allow board of directors to deliberate and rummage strategic issues of corporate organisations. 
Also, frequent meetings will possibly aid board members to get abreast with emerging issues in corporate 
organisations. Nevertheless, these meetings have to be effective and efficient in a manner that will inform 
directors about the emerging issues of the corporate organisation and how they are to be addressed (Agyemang 
& Castellini, 2013). Meeting times have to be properly and efficiently utilised to offer the required and suitable 
information, to permit in-depth discussions. Agyemang and Castellini (2013) argue that for board members to 
effectively perform their fiduciary duties and responsibilities to the benefit of the corporate organisation, they 
should be fully informed about all the major developments in the organisation. The authors continue that when 
board members are furnished with the right information at the right time, they would be able to play their roles 
effectively, which will eventually result in board effectiveness. The principles of corporate governance of the 
OECD (1999; 2004) and the 2010 SEC Guidelines of Corporate Governance of Ghana stress on the significance 
of providing information to directors when the need arises. This implies that timeliness and adequacy of 
information to board of directors can help them to effectively and efficiently deliberate on strategic issues of the 
corporate organisation. It is therefore reasonable that effective and efficient board meetings would enhance board 
effectiveness and thus lead to board control. Thus we propose that:     
Proposition 2d. Effective and efficient board meetings lead to an extensive board control in a firm. 
 
3. Methodology 
The study employed a qualitative case study research approach to gather data from the four corporate 
organisations and was steered by a case study protocol. Following Rowley (2002) the case study protocol 
encompassed the study’s overview, clarification of the aim of the research and field procedures such as the 
application of diverse sources of data and how they were accessed.  It also specified other data sources -such as 
the companies’ yearly reports, observations at the annual general meetings of the companies- and procedures for 
ensuring research quality. The protocol assisted the researchers to spell out in detail how the study’s questions 
were to be answered. In all, 42 individuals were interviewed to elicit catholic and substantial information on how 
internal governance structures function in the corporations. The study’s respondents included chief executive 
officers, board chairpersons, non-executive directors, corporate secretaries, officials of Ghana Stock Exchange 
(GSE) and Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana, institutional representatives, shareholders, and past 
executives and non-executives of the corporate organisations. The inclusion of past executives and non-
executives in this research was to get hold of additional insight into how the internal governance structures in 
these companies worked in the past.  
 
The various interviews were tape recorded and transcribed immediately after each session. Following Miles and 
Huberman (1994) as well as Ravasi and Zattoni (2006), transcriptions were supported by contact summary 
sheets and interview notes. Although interviews were substantially carried out in English language, some were 
also carried out in Akan language (one of the local languages in Ghana). However, during the writing stage, the 
quotations from the interviews in the Akan language were translated into English. In order to ensure uniformity 
in the data collection procedure across all levels, all interviews were conducted by the researchers. In addition, 
textual data in the form of prospectuses, extracts from internal files, annual reports and circular to shareholders 
aided the researchers in narrating historical backgrounds of the companies. Direct observation was employed to 
help the researchers to have direct experience with how the companies organized their annual meetings. It aided 
the researchers to ascertain how votes were conducted during annual meetings, how decisions were taken, how 
minority equity holders were permitted to ask questions, how directors were elected, how directors reacted to 
questions from minority equity holders vis-à-vis questions from majority equity holders and other gamut of 
actions. The multi-approach data collection was used to enhance data credibility, offer triangulation among the 
techniques and maximize the sequence of available information to the researchers (Yin, 2009).  
 
Case study analysis, more often than not, entails in-depth case write-ups for each case (Eisenhardt, 1989). These 
detailed write-ups are normally pure descriptions but they are vital to the development of the capacity of 
individuals to establish the true nature of a situation (Gersick cited in Eisenhardt, 1989). McNulty, Zattoni and 
Douglas (2013, p. 188) suggest that “corporate governance is a complex multi-level phenomenon and research 
can be developed along different levels of analyzes”. Accordingly, this study relied on the constructed theoretical 
propositions and the development of a case description for its analyses. With this strategy, there was a 
descriptive framework for organizing the case study while following the propositions. In order to ensure 
anonymity, the names of the corporate organisations used in this study were pseudonyms to enhance easy 
reading.  
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Case A: Quality Commercial Bank (QCB)  
The ownership structure of the company 
QCB was established in 1953 and was first recognised as the Bank of the Gold Coast. After the country’s 
independence in 1957, it was renamed, Quality Commercial Bank. The bank was solely owned by the state until 
1996 when under the privatisation programme, the then government decided to divest some of the state’s 
holdings. Currently, the holdings of the state stand at 21.36%, while individuals and institutional holdings add up 
to 78.6%. Social Security and Insurance Trust (SSNIT) holds 29.81% of the entire shares of the company. But it 
is interesting to note that although SSNIT’s holdings are supposed to be independent of the state, the 
appointments of top management officials by the government have made the state to interfere and control the 
holdings of SSNIT. Therefore, with the combination of the state’s holdings and that of SSNIT, the state becomes 
the majority shareholder with 51.17% of the total shares of the company. The listing of the company on the GSE 
has made it to issue 265,000,000 shares to 96,805 individual shareholders. Other current minority shareholders 
are: BBGN Northern Trust COAVFC 6314B (6.68%), Daniel Ofori (3.32%), SCBN/ PICTET Africa Non Tax 
6275J (1.65%) and GCB Staff Provident Fund (1.13%). As at 2011, the bank’s market capitalisation stood at 
GH₵ 72,000,000 (equivalent to 32,000,000 USD).  
 
Shareholder control 
Essentially, there are two noteworthy structures upon which shareholders of QCB exercise their controlling 
prowess over the firm. These are annual general meetings and the incessant influence over decision-making 
processes of the company by the state (ie. the majority shareholder). With the merger of the holdings of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and that of SSNIT’s, the state becomes majority stockholder of 
QCB. Consequently, the state has been wielding control over the firm through its appointment of key individuals 
of the company. The state also has direct contact with these important people (ie. the Managing director/Chief 
Executive Officer and the Board Chairman). Influence over decision-making processes or procedures including 
voting control, effortless access to information as well as direct involvement in the management of the company, 
are pertinent ways of control available to the state. The government does not wait for decisions to be taken at the 
annual general meetings of the company or the minimum disclosures obligated by law to exert its control or 
influence over the company. This is because; it can depend on the incessant delivery of information by the 
management of QCB to it (ie. the government). These provisions have created a platform that makes the 
government/state to have access to all relevant information and decisions that arise at QCB. The participation of 
the state in the operations combines QCB’s governance system with its management duties. The minority 
shareholders, unlike the state, have access to defined information, which are available in the minimum statutory 
disclosures required by law.  
 
Board of Directors     
GCB has nine members on its board. Out of this, nine are non-executive directors. The company’s directors 
consist of current and retired senior officers and academics. The board chairman is an academic with extensive 
experience in economic policy analysis and economic reform mechanisms. Other members include former 
Director and Head of Human Resource Department of the central bank of Ghana, a business executive, Deputy 
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Investment banker, a lawyer, the current Director for Regulatory 
Administration Division of the National Communication Authority (NCA), a chartered accountant by profession, 
the managing director of the company, the company’s secretary and two deputy managing directors in charge of 
operations and finance. The positions of the board chairperson and the managing director of the company have 
been separated. In regards to appointment, directors are selected through a process that is politically motivated. 
This implies that the government, which functions as majority shareholder, virtually appoints its party apologists 
to the board. This leaves no room for minority shareholders to have a say in the appointment of directors to the 
company’s board. This was manifested during the company’s annual meeting in 2012, when minority 
shareholders raised an issue about the criterion upon which the Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning was nominated for approval. This issue created tension in the sense that the board chairperson had to 
come in to convince these aggrieved minority shareholders, but in the end, he was not able to give proper 
explanation to them. However, at the end of the annual general meeting, the board was able to maneuver its way 
to get the Minister approved. The board is required by the governance regulations of the company to meet four 
times in a year, but can be increased when circumstances demand. For instance, in 2010, the board met 73 times. 
The board is appropriately furnished with all relatable information of the company before board discussions. 
With respect to board committees, the board of QCB has instituted two important board committees-the audit 
and remuneration board committees. These committees are chaired by non-executive directors as required by 
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law. The committees are required to meet quarterly, but in peculiar situations, they can meet more than what is 
specified. For example, the audit committee met ten times in 2010.  
Board Control      
 
The board of QCB does not have the right to hire or dismiss the managing director without prior approval by the 
government. The company’s board can only offer advice to the government if it holds the notion that the 
managing director is not up to task. Although the board remuneration committee of the company sets the 
remuneration package of the managing director, this package has to be approved by the government prior to its 
implementation. This implies that the government wields all the controlling activities of the board thus leaving 
the board to play an advisory role in the company. Even though the board has established some mechanisms to 
evaluate the performance of the managing director, such mechanism has been found as unnecessary in the sense 
that the government through its own evaluation mechanism conducts its own assessment on the basis of the 
unremitting information sent to it by the management of QCB. The only control activity that the board 
undertakes is by discussing and approving corporate strategies of the company. However, during the interview, it 
was revealed that even after the approval of these strategies, the board still has to seek the consent of the 
government before they are executed.   
 
CASE B: QT BANK (QT)   
The ownership structure of QT 
QT bank was established as a financial organisation in 1997 under the name QT financial services. It was 
formerly called QT financial services limited. It was listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange in 2008. Currently, the 
company has issued 456,310,181 shares to 9,858 shareholders. QT holdings limited is the majority shareholder 
with 61.1% of the entire shares of the company. Other equity holders of the bank include JPMC Africa 
Capitalization Fund Ltd (10.14%), International Finance Corporation (10.14%), Investec Premier Funds Pcc Ltd. 
Africa Fund (3.73%), Investec Assets MGT PTY (2.11%), Duet Africa Opportunities Fund IC (1.47%), Kura 
Africa Fund (1.37%) and so on. As at 2011, the company’s market capitalisation stood at GH₵85,275,000 
(which is equivalent to 42,637,500 USD).  
 
Ownership control 
Unlike the previous case where the majority shareholder is able to absolutely wield control over the company, 
the rules and regulations governing the very existence of QT bank have set a limit to the extent to which a single 
equity holder can exercise control over the company through the board of directors. The company has ensured 
that every shareholder who holds at least 5% of the entire shares of the company is entitled to be a board member 
or select a representative to the board.  However, the majority shareholder of the company has the propensity to 
exercise a certain degree of influence over the company’s decision-making processes as compared to other 
shareholders who have representatives on the board. This became evident when the CEO of the company 
revealed such kind of influence the company’s largest shareholder wields in the decision-making processes of 
the company during an interview session. Inasmuch as QT holdings limited (which is the majority shareholder) 
has a certain degree of influence over the decision-making processes of the bank, it normally gets access to 
vitally important information about the operations of the bank. This implies that QT holdings limited always gets 
hold of relevant information about the company before they are disseminated to other shareholders. With the 
exception of other shareholders who are represented on the board, the bank’s minority shareholders, more often 
than not, rely on the company’s annual general meetings to access information about the company since they 
cannot directly get them from the board of directors of the bank.      
 
Board of directors 
Currently, QT bank has six board directors of whom four (4) are non-executive directors. The executive directors 
include the company’s chief executive officer and his deputy. The company’s directors are made up of business 
professionals in fields such as insurance, accountancy, management, investment and so on. The company’s 
founding fathers also sit on the board. These two individuals are on the board not because of the role they played 
in the company’s establishment, but by virtue of their equity capital holdings in the company. The rules and 
regulations governing the company itemizes that any shareholder who holds at least 5% of the total equity capital 
of the company does qualify to be a board member or to appoint a representative on the board. The roles of the 
chief executive officer and the board chairperson of the company have been split. However, this schism of roles 
in this corporate entity is considered as power-sharing between the two founders of the company, as opposed to 
considering it as an attempt to initiate checks and balances. In regards to board meetings, the board of the bank 
meets four times in a year as required by the company’s rules and regulations, but can be increased when there is 
a need. For instance, in 2011, the board met six times. Aside the various reports that management of the 
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company makes available to board members, the agenda for board meetings are sent to members twenty-one 
days prior to board meetings. The amount of information that board members receive from the company’s 
management provide a source for board members to wield control over the decision-making processes of the 
company. One of the non-executive directors in an interview had the following to say: 
The various reports I have been receiving from the company’s management 
are more detailed and informative, a situation that is different when I was 
serving as a board member in a company, I reserve to mention. With these 
reports, I always get the opportunity to painstakingly scrutinise them, which 
then help me make sound and proactive suggestions during board meetings.   
The board has established audit and remuneration committees. These committees are entirely made up of non-
executive directors. Both committees are made up of three non-executive directors. They are supposed to meet 
quarterly as stipulated by the company’s code of business ethics, but can be increased if situations call for it.  
 
Board control 
The board of directors of QT bank performs all activities that are related to the control functions of the board. It 
has the authority to replace or dismiss the CEO for non-performance. The board always determines the sort of 
information it needs from management to carry out its functions in an appropriate manner. Through the 
remuneration committee, the board decides and approves the remuneration packages of the CEO and other top 
management officials of the bank. In terms of the bank’s corporate strategies, the board discusses and approves 
every strategy of the bank. Furthermore, the board’s remuneration committee has established formal evaluation 
mechanisms to evaluate the activities of the CEO, individual board members and the board in general. The audit 
committee through its work helps the board to make sure that the company complies with the existing laws (for 
instance, the generally accepted accounting and auditing principles that are spelt out by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Ghana) regarding the operations of the company.  
CASE C: KINGS BREWERY LIMITED (KBL) 
 
The ownership structure of KBL 
Kings Brewery Limited (KBL) is the oldest brewing company in West Africa. It was formally called overseas 
breweries limited. In 1975, the state-controlled locally registered company called Kings Brewery limited 
acquired the assets of overseas brewery limited. Twenty-years later, the state decided to sell out its stocks in the 
company as a result of the privatisation programme the then government undertook. Consequently, SABMiller 
plc purchased the majority of the company’s shares thus making SABMiller plc the majority shareholder with 
69.20% of the entire stocks of the company.   Other shareholders of the company are Social Security and 
National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) (11.13%), Ziga Investment Company (1.23%), StarLife Assurance Company 
Ltd. (0.77%), Accra Brewery Ltd. Employees Trust (0.76%), Epack Investment Fund (0.59%), Databank 
Brokerage Ltd. (0.56%), HOTZ (0.15%), Merban Stockbrokers Portfolio (0.12%), Kwaku Okyere and Company 
Ltd. (0.08%). Star Assurance Company Ltd. (0.07%), Unique Trust Financial Services (0.07%) and the general 
public (5.67%).  
 
Shareholder control 
Through the majority holdings of the entire shares of KBL, SABMiller plc exercises shareholder control over the 
operations of the company. SABMiller’s easy access to vital information, its influence over decision-making 
processes and direct participation in the administration and operations of the company allow it to exercise 
extensive control over the company. SABMiller plc does not depend on the minimum disclosures required by 
law or the company’s annual meetings to get access to important governance information in the company. It 
always relies on the available information the management of the company makes available to it upon request. 
The reports from company’s management to SABMiller plc involve germane operational matters such as cash 
positions, product quality, and sale targets. These reports are provided to SABMiller on a daily, weekly, monthly 
and yearly basis. This implies that KBL annual general meetings are mere statutory requirement and perhaps, 
serve more as a platform for other shareholders to get hold of what actually is going on in their company. The 
participation of SABMiller plc in the operations of the company combines KBL governance system with its 
management duties. Other shareholders, unlike the SABMiller plc, have access to defined information, which are 
available in the minimum mandatory information required by law.  
 
Board of directors   
The board of directors of KBL is made up of four (4) directors. The composition of the board mirrors the 
ownership structure of the corporate entity. Three of the directors are non-executive directors with vast 
experience in the brewing industry as well as in their areas of specialty. In regards to director appointment, 
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members of KBL’s board are selected through a procedure designed by SABMiller plc. This implies that 
individuals who serve on KBL’s board are appointed by SABMiller plc. The leadership structure of the board 
takes the form of the non-duality structure. This means that the position of the board chairperson has been 
separated from the position of the managing director of the company. Board meetings are required to be held 
four times per annum but it can be increased when circumstances demand. For instance meetings can be 
increased to deal with issues that are urgent without waiting for formal meetings. For formal meetings, members 
of the board are informed twenty-one days prior to their commencements. Board members are also served with 
information about the management and operations of the company at least a week before board meetings. In 
terms of committees, the board has only established an audit committee to appraise both the operational and 
financial activities of the corporate entity. The board’s audit committee is made up of four members of whom 
three are non-executive directors. This committee is chaired by an executive of SABMiller plc. This implies that 
the activities of the committee are influenced by SABMiller through the chairperson of the committee.  
 
Board control     
The decision to hire or fire KBL’s managing director cannot be carried out by the company’s board. The only 
thing the board can do is to offer an advice to the management of SABMiller plc if it holds the notion that the 
managing director is not performing as expected of him. The remuneration packages of the managing director 
and other top management officials of the company are not determined by the board but SABMiller plc. More 
so, there are no explicit evaluation measures that have been instituted by the board to evaluate the performances 
of the managing director, individual directors and the board as a whole. However, such evaluations are also 
conducted by SABMiller plc on the basis of the regular reports that are provided by the management of the 
company to it. In conclusion, SABMiller plc performs all the control activities within the company thus leaving 
the board as an advisory body to the management of the company.  
CASE D: CHARTERED INSURANCE COMPANY (CIC) 
 
The ownership structure of CIC 
Chartered Insurance Company (CIC) is among the non-life insurance corporate entities that are in operation in 
Ghana. It was established in 1955 and was first called Gold Coast Insurance Company. In 1957, its name was 
changed to Ghana Insurance Company. The company was incorporated by an Executive Instrument (E.I) No. 17 
as Chartered Insurance Corporation in February, 1962. In 1995, under the government’s privatisation 
programme, the company became a limited liability entity. Consequently, individuals and institutional capital 
providers acquired equity capital of the company. Currently, the government/state holds 40% of the entire shares 
of the company. Interestingly, SSNIT, which is a state-controlled institution, also holds 11.291% of the 
company’s shares. The common deduction that can be drawn with regards to the holdings of SSNIT is that since 
it is a state-controlled institution, the government has control over its holdings in CIC. Therefore, the 
combination of the shares of SSNIT and that of the government makes the state/government, the majority 
shareholder with 51.291% of the entire equity capital of CIC.  Other shareholders of CIC are STD Nom. TVL 
(Pty) Ltd. /Standard Bank Plc clients A/C (3.592%), Ghana Reinsurance Company Limited (3.408%), SIC Life 
Company Limited (1.704%), BBGN/BBH Cust DZ Bank Int. S.A. Lux-Silk FD-African Lion FD GH (1.647%), 
BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. Deut Africa Opportunity Fund (1.621%), SIC- FSL/SIC Provident Fund (1.608%), 
BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. Renaissance African Master Fund (1.442%), BBGN/JP Morgan Chase Onshore 
6178C (1.124%), BBGN/PICTET Africa Non Tax 6257J (1.048%), Ghana Commercial Bank Limited (1.022%), 
Teachers’ Fund (0.852%), Dr. Kofi Amoah (0.767%), STD Nom. TVL (Pty) Ltd./Standard Bank Plc clients A/C 
(0.559%), BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. AIG Sub-Sah. Africa Master Fund (0.511%), BBGN/Barclays Maur. Re. 
Renaissance African Market Fund (0.434%), Ghana Cocoa Company Limited (0.421%), STD Nom. TVL (Pty) 
Ltd./Metlife Classic Fund (0.314%) and the general populace consisting of about 80,00 who owns small numbers 
of shares (26.14%). As at 2011, the market capitalization of CIC stood at GH₵2,500,000 (which is equivalent to 
1,250,000 USD).  
 
Shareholder control 
The government exercises absolute control in the affairs of the company. Anytime the government requires any 
form of information about the company, the company’s management does not hesitate to provide. Monthly, 
quarterly and yearly reports are made available to the government upon request. Usually, the management of 
CIC requires government’s approval before major decisions can be made in the company. More so, the 
government always has access to key individuals-such as the board’s chairperson and the managing director-of 
the company. The government has the discretionary power to summon the board chairperson and the managing 
director to ponder on matters in relation to the company’s performance and the way forward. The government, 
through its council of state/advisory group selects these key people within the company. For example, in 2009, 
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the present government, with its greater influence, reconstituted the board with its political apologists. The 
methods in which agendas are set and how annual meetings are held minimize the influence of minority 
shareholders over the company’s affairs. The company’s annual general meeting in 2011 raised some criticisms 
from the minority shareholders. One minority shareholder in an interview said that: 
The manner in which the agenda for the meeting has been prepared is such 
that a number of essential elements have been mislaid in order not to allow 
us [shareholders] to get hold of important issues within the company. This is 
to furnish management the necessary platform to cover up information. 
This assertion implies that minority shareholders of the company can only be furnished with the required 
information they need if and only if the management of the company so wishes.  
 
Board of directors 
Presently, CIC has nine board members of whom eight are non-executive directors. The only executive member 
on the board is the managing director of the company. Members of the board are made up of business magnates, 
a chartered accountant, an actuary, an economist, a financial analyst, an engineer, a lawyer and a medical 
practitioner. The government through the council of state/advisory body selects the members who constitute the 
company’s board. This implies that the company’s board is largely, if not entirely, made up of the loyalists of the 
government. Even though the composition of the board is political, the government through the council of state 
appoints well-qualified and competent individuals to the company’s board. This appointment procedure makes 
the board independent of the company’s management. The positions of the board chairperson and that of the 
managing director of the company have been divided. More so, the board meets quarterly and this can be 
increased as and when the need arises. Members are always furnished with the necessary and sufficient 
information about the firm four weeks prior to board meetings by the company’s management. This then gives 
members sufficient time to scrutinise and examine those reports before board meetings. With respect to 
committees, the board has only instituted an audit committee, which functions as a monitoring mechanism to 
financial and accounting issues in the company. It meets four times a year but it can be increased if 
circumstances require. The audit committee of CIC constitutes four (4) non-executive directors and it is required 
that at any given period, at least two (2) of these members must be financially inclined.  
 
Board control 
The power to hire or dismiss the company’s managing director is vested in the government. The company’s 
board can only advice the government to either fire or boot out the managing director when the board finds out 
that the managing director is not performing satisfactorily. A typical example occurred in 2012 where the 
managing director was asked by the government to step aside from an advice given to it (ie. the government) by 
the board. The reason behind this decision was no properly communicated to other shareholders of the company 
thus making them to get disappointed. The other shareholders exhibited their displeasure during the company’s 
annual general meeting in 2012. They needed an explanation from the company’s board as to why the 
company’s managing director was relieved of his post. However, the board was reluctant to give the required 
explanation to them in regards to the action the government took. This unwillingness of the board to furnish the 
other shareholders the needed explanation, made some of them to walk out of the meeting. The simple 
explanation that was given to the researchers by one of those shareholders who walked out of the meeting was 
that: 
I walked out of the meeting with an idea that, the board would be compelled to give an 
explanation, but as you witnessed, the board was still hesitant. ……I do not consider 
our board as a credible or dependable board. A board, which does not want minority 
shareholders to know exactly what goes on in the company in which they have a stake 
in….Oh my God!! I have regretted investing in such a company. Today this, tomorrow 
that. What at all do they [board members] do? Perhaps it is not their fault since there is a 
big hand [the government] that instructs them to serve its interest. What I mean is, all of 
them [board members] are government appointees and they are being compelled to 
serve the government’s interest. Everything is political….. There is something fishy 
somewhere and we [minority shareholders] need to know. 
The above statement by the minority shareholder demonstrates that the board of CIC does not possess the power 
to dismiss or fire the company’s managing director unless it is given the ‘green light’ by the government to do 
so. Although the board determines the remuneration package of the managing director, it has to be always 
assented by the government. The implication is that without the government’s approval, there is no way the 
board can implement such plan. Moreover, the board through its audit committee has put in place some 
mechanisms to assess the performances of the managing director, board members and the board. However, such 
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evaluation is not effective in the sense that the government implicitly evaluates the performances of the 
managing director, individual directors and the board through the frequent reports made available to it by the 
company’s management.   
4.1Recapitulation of the findings   
This paper laid out how both the ownership and board control systems work in four publicly-quoted corporate 
organisations in Ghana. Table 1 below sets out a compendium of the observable facts that were highlighted in 
this paper.   
Table 1: The governance practice and observable facts of the study 






The government holds 51.17% and 51.291% of the shares of QCB and CIC 
respectively. These holdings by the government in these companies make it the 
majority shareholder. With respect to QT bank, QT holdings limited holds 61.1% 
of the company’s total shares thus making it the majority shareholder. 
SABMiller plc holds 61.1% of the entire equity capital of KBL therefore, 
making it the majority equity holder.  
 
Shareholder control Large shareholders of these four companies wield extensive control over their 
management. In the case of QCB, KBL and CIC, their majority shareholders 
appoint key individuals such as the board chairperson and the chief executive 
officer. As a result of these appointments, majority shareholders have access to 
these key individuals in these companies. In regards to QT, even though the 
majority shareholder does not appoint such individuals, it still has access to these 
key personalities in the company. With the exception of QT where the majority 
shareholder cannot fire or replace the CEO, majority shareholders of the other 
three companies have the power to fire or replace their CEOs. In all four 
companies, majority shareholders always get hold of important information 
about their companies before they are provided to other shareholders. Other 
shareholders of these companies always have to rely on the annual general 
meetings of the companies and the minimum disclosures mandated by law to get 
access to information.   









In all four companies, non-executive directors constitute the majority of their 
boards. Also, the positions of the chief executives and the board chairmen have 
been split. Board meetings are organized as recommended by law and the 
companies’ rules and regulations. Members get hold of required information in 
time prior to board meetings. Furthermore, all the companies have audit 
committees. With the exception of KBL, all the members of the audit 
committees are non-executive directors. QCB and QT have established board 
remuneration committees with non-executive directors as their members. KBL 
and CIC have not established board remuneration committees.   
With the exception of QT where its board performs all the controlling activities 
(ie. hiring and firing the CEO, and setting up the CEO’s remuneration package), 
the boards of the other three organisations only function as advisory bodies to the 
company. The three boards function as agents of their controlling equity holders. 
Also, in these three organisations, the appointment and replacement of their chief 
executive officers are done by the controlling shareholders. The controlling 
shareholders in these three organisations play decisive role in setting up the 




5. Confirmation of propositions 
The findings reveal that, all four organisations investigated have large controlling shareholders. These 
controlling shareholders are important mechanisms in driving good governance in these organisations. This 
means that Proposition 1, which states that: Shareholders with larger shares exert shareholder control in a 
company is verified in all four corporate organisations. 
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In terms of a formal audit committee, the findings indicate that all four organisations have established a board 
audit committees with non-executive directors as their members. However, the observable facts also reveal that, 
there is a relationship between a board audit committee and board control in only one organisation. This means 
that Proposition 2a, which states:  Instituting a board audit committee with independent directors, leads to board 
control in an organisation is verified in one organisation and not verified in the other three.  
 
The findings of a board remuneration committee show that two of the four organisations investigated have 
established a remuneration committee. In spite of this, a relationship between a board remuneration committee 
and board control does exist in only one of these two organisations. This implies that, Proposition 2b, which 
states: Setting up a board remuneration committee with independent directors, leads to board control is 
confirmed in one organisation and not confirmed in the other three.    
 
With regards to the leadership structure, the observable facts depict that the positions of the Chief Executive 
Officer and that of the Chairperson have been separated in all four organisations. However, the relationship 
between this separation and board control was not realised. This means that, Proposition 2c, which states: The 
non-duality structure with independent chairperson results in board control is not confirmed in all four 
corporate organisations.  
 
With respect to board meetings, the observable facts depict that, elements of effective and efficient board 
meetings are in existence in all four organisations. However, the connection between effective and efficient 
board meetings, and board control was only realised in one organisation. This implies that, Proposition 2d, which 
states: An effective and efficient board meetings result in an extensive board control is verified in one 
organisation and not verified in the other three.   
 
6. Discussion 
From the study’s analyses, it can be deduced that there is a presence of ownership concentration in all four 
companies. Each company has a single equity holder that holds more than 50% of its total shares. This ownership 
concentration reflects the historical developments that keep shaping corporate governance practice in Ghana. The 
ownership structures of KBL, QCB and CIC reflect the country’s privatisation policy in the 1990s. The QT bank 
was established after the reforms and its ownership structure reflects the sources of fund used for its 
establishment. Its establishment was funded by QT holdings, which is now the majority shareholder of the bank. 
This ownership characteristic is not limited to these four organisations, but to most companies that are listed on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange (Agyemang & Castellini, 2013). This is consistent with the findings of Berglof and 
Claessens (2004) that most companies in the developing and transition economies are characterized by ownership 
concentration.   
 
As a result of the presence of ownership concentration in all four companies, large shareholders tend to wield 
control over the activities of the companies through their participation in the decision-making processes. This 
kind of participation is only made possible through the incessant flow of information from the management of the 
companies to them (ie. large shareholders). For instance, whilst small or minority shareholders always depend on 
the minimum statutory disclosure in the companies’ audited annual reports and unaudited reports, large 
shareholders of these companies get access to information upon request. These large shareholders have access to 
key individuals (such as the CEOs and the board chairmen) in these companies. This level of accessibility makes 
these large shareholders to have influence on these key individuals and the companies in general. The influential 
role of the large shareholders in these organisations comes to light during the annual general meetings of the 
companies. For instance, when major decisions that need stockholders’ approval are to be subject to voting, large 
shareholders usually determine the voting outcome.    
 
The extensive control these large shareholders have on the activities of these organisations has been considered 
and positively regarded by the regulatory bodies of Ghana (ie. the SEC and GSE). This is as a result of the poor 
enforcement of rules and regulations in regards to corporate governance practice in Ghana thus allowing large 
shareholders to safeguard their investments. This implies that large shareholders serve as a substitute for legal 
protection by ensuring investor protection in Ghana. This finding is supported by the assertion of La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that the presence of ownership concentration serves as a substitute for 
legal protection for economies that are characterized by weak investor-protection. In an interview with an official 
of the SEC, this was what he said: 
Since companies in developed countries are well-supervised, they have the tendency 
to perform well. This situation is different from developing contries’ experience. 
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This is because, our companies are poorly supervised. And for that matter, it is 
incumbent on these controlling shareholders to supervise their companies in order to 
put them on track so that they can perform well. Until we started enforcing our laws, 
we should not attempt to oppose this kind of occurrence.   
This submission is in line with the assertion that in times of unpredictable or weak enforcement of legal and 
regulatory framework, shareholders do not anticipate that their interests will be safeguarded through lawful 
channels and hence they do take a more direct involvement in governance oversight, either via better rights 
offered through charters and bylaws, or via direct representation on companies’ boards (Larcker & Tayan, 2011).   
The study’s analyses also portray that in the case of QT bank, board members/directors carry out all activities in 
relation to the control function of the board: taking decisions in terms of hiring and disciplining the CEO; 
replacing the CEO in case of mismanagement; discussing and approving the company’s strategies, determining 
the type of information they need from management; and setting up the CEOs compensation package. In the 
other three cases of QCB, CIC and KBL, board members have limited control over the activities of the 
organisations. The only control activity that members carry out is to discuss and approve corporate strategies in 
these three organisations. But these discussions of corporate strategies are not for the purpose of exerting board 
control over the activities of management. They rather provide board members the opportunity to offer advice to 
management on how the set goals can be realised. This result is consistent with the findings of Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2008), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Adam and Mehran (2003), and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001).   
 
With respect to a formal assessment of the activities of the chief executive officer, the board and individual 
board members, it was observed that, directors of QCB, CIC and KBL perform an implicit assessment of their 
chief executive officers/ Managing directors. The levels of assessment of boards of directors of GCB, SIC and 
ABL differ from that of QT bank in that, directors of QCB, CIC and KBL do conduct such assessments only 
when they are discussing and approving corporate strategies of these organisations. In the case of QT bank, the 
board performs its controlling function without any interference from the controlling shareholders. 
 
In QCB, CIC and KBL, the control function of directors has been replaced by the controlling prowess of their 
controlling shareholders. This is in line with the assertion of Roe (2003) that, when a controlling shareholder 
exerts an extensive control over the activities of management, it leaves little room for the board to exercise its 
control function. Although the controlling shareholders of QCB, CIC and KBL exercise control over the activities 
of the company, they (ie. the controlling shareholders) leave room for directors to exert a certain level of control 
as witnessed through their involvement in discussing and approving of corporate strategies.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The paper examined how shareholder and board control systems work within corporate organisations to ensuring 
effective corporate governance. A defensible qualitative case study approach was applied to gather the required 
information needed for the study’s analyses. The use of interviews, observations and archival records to gather 
data from four corporate organisations listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange offered the study catholic and 
significant information for its analyses. The study reveals that shareholders with significant amounts of shares in 
companies wield panoptic control over the companies. This implies that shareholder control is vital determining 
factor to ensuring effective corporate governance in Ghana. Although the presence of these major shareholders 
has the tendency to solving the agency problems in these companies, it creates problem in relation to minority 
shareholders’ interests. Also, the findings illuminate that boards of directors tend to wield control over corporate 
organisations when majority shareholders stop interfering in their dealings. This implies that when major 
shareholders fully partake in corporate decision-making processes of companies, boards of directors seem to be 
sheer advisory bodies to management.  
 
On the basis of these findings, the study recommends the following: Firstly, minority shareholders have to be 
protected. And this essentially requires that the implementation of the existing rules and regulations regarding 
corporate governance in Ghana should be fully realised. It also requires a simultaneous execution of other 
strategies such as the gaining of greater access to corporate information by minority shareholders, constant 
revision of the extant regulatory framework of corporate governance and educating minority stockholders. The 
availability of important governance information to minority shareholders will enable them to challenge 
corporate managers and major shareholders which will eventually obviate a potential diversion of corporate 
assets. Secondly, since gender diversity has recently become an important issue in corporate governance 
discourse; corporate organisations should critically look at it. Although this study did not take into consideration 
the number of women who sit on boards of corporate organisations in Ghana, in the course of the study, it was 
evidenced that women were significantly under-represented on boards of all four cases investigated. It is argued 
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that since managerial talent is consistently fragmented across men and women, limiting boards to predominantly 
include men-if not them only-gets rid of an equally qualified talented group in our societies (Larcker & Tayan, 
2011). This means that the representation of women on corporate boards might positively influence board 
activities thus leading to board control. For instance, women representation on corporate boards can improve 
board independence by minimizing social differences that can compromise boards’ independence. Also, women 
would probably demonstrate higher levels of credibility and teamwork than their counterparts, hence enhancing 
boardroom discussions. As a result of the benefits that corporations can possibly derive from women 
representation on their boards, future studies can focus on how women-participation on boards of corporate 
organisations can help improve board activities.  
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